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Article 4

EQUITY
BEN F. SMALL, JR.*

The material presented in the field of Equity is summary, chiefly because of its incidental coverage in other contributions to this symposium. Much of the subject matter
of Equity will be found in the fields of Contracts, Security,
Property, Procedure, and Labor Law. Thus, in view of the
meagerness of non-ancillary Equity material and the desire
not to be repetitious, it is felt that a mere cataloging of the
materials in that field will suffice.
Legal and Equitable Remedies.
The case of Ruubens v. Marion Washington Realty Corp.,
was discussed in the mterial under Corporations, supra. A
stockholder sued for payment of dividends on corporate stock
which the corporation should have declared, but had not. The
court first pointed out that in regard to dividends, no duty
of payment exists until after a declaration by the directors,
and that if directors arbitrarily and without cause refuse to
make a declaration, then the stockholder's refiedy is in equity
to compel the declaration. Since the complaint in the instant
case sounded in express assumpsit as for money due, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of
action under the theeory upon which she sued, that her suit
should have been an equitable one to compel a declaration
of dividends.
In spite of the adoption of code pleading and the abolition
of all distinctions between an action at law and a suit in
equity, 2 the court refused to consider the case as one in equity,
although admitting3 that the complaint probably alleged a
prima facie duty on the part of the corporation to declare
and pay the dividends, and also "the probability of a right
to a mandatory injunction or writ of mandamus to compel the
appellee to declare the dividend." Since the issue of the
validity of the complaint in its equitable aspect was not one
of those presented to the Appellate Court, the court was
Assistant Professor, Indiana Umversity Law School, Evening
Division.
1. Ind. App. , 59 N.E. (2d) 907 (1945).
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-101.
3. At 911.
*
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probably technically -correct in saying4 that it should not
pass on that issue because to do so would "foreclose the
appellee's opportunity of so testing it and predicating error
on the ruling." It would seem however, that at this late
date, no test need be made of the sufficiency of a complaint
which alleges an equitable cause of action under a legal theory.
Multiplicity; Bills of Peace.
Amertcan Lead Corp. v. Davss5 holds that a plaintiff
may enjoin separate actions at law by different persons where
there is a community of interest among the persons bringing
them. The facts of the case were that individual actions
for damages had been brought by about 150 residents of a
community in which plaintiff operated its plant, all predicated on the issue of damages arising from the operation by
plaintiff of a nuisance. Since the interest was the same
in all cases, the court held the plaintiff entitled to an injunction against the prosecution of the claims separately.
This type of suit is in its nature very similar to the Com0
mon Law Bill of Peace.
Jury.
George v. Massey Harris Co.7 holds that a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage was of exclusive equitable cognizance
before 1852, so that under the present statute8 both legal and
factual questions must be tried by the court without a jury.
Even though certain elements of an action at law may incidentally be involved, if the essential part of the cause is exclusively of equitable cognizance, then the right of trial by
jury does not obtain.
Laches.
In Engel v. Mathley, the plaintiff, discharged from her
school without cause, taught in another township for three
and a half years, then returned to the school from which
she had been discharged and taught there under definite
yearly contracts for four years without making any claim
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ibid.
111 Ind. App. 242, 38 N.E. (2d) 281 (1941).
See McClintock, Equity (1936) §169, Walsh, Equity (1930)
109 Ind. App. 305, 34 N.E. (2d) 956 (1941).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-1204.
113 Ind. App. 458, 48 N.E. (2d) 463 (1943).

§118.
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to her rights as a tenure teacher before her discharge. Then
upon refusal of the township trustee to renew her yearly
contract, the plaintiff sued for a mandatory injunction ordering the trustees to permit her to teach as a tenure teacher.
In spite of her seven and one-half year silence as to her
original tenure rights, the court held her not to be barrred
from relief by laches. In arriving at this position, the court
pointed to the plaintiff's relation with the defendant township for the four-year period after she resumed her teaching
there, and quoted 0 Lost Creek School Township v. York,"Indiana's leading teacher tenure case, to the effect that "a
permanent tenure teacher's indefinite contract is a protected
contractual right entitling the teacher to a succession of
define contracts." Thus, whatever her degree of slumber
prior to the time when she resumed teaching with her former
employer, she was a tenure teacher during that four-year
period and as such, did not have to assert her rights which
were during that time accorded full recognition anyway.
Hence her demand was not "stale".
In Haas v. Holder,"2 another tenure teacher was denied
a position in 1930. However, she again taught in 1931 and
1932, then was refused again in 1933, and every year thereafter. She was held not to be guilty of laches in waiting
until 1938 to sue.
In Phillippe v. Axe, 1" a tenure teacher was given notice by his school board that it had fixed a date for the consideration of is contract. The teacher made no request for
a hearing within fifteen days, as authorized by statute,14
and after due consideration of the contract, the board cancelled it. In a later suit by the teacher for an injunction
against the board's interfering with his employment, the
court held that the teacher's silence should be treated as a
consent to whatever action the board might take.
In another case where a temporary restraining order
was given without notice to the defendant and a date set for
hearing on a temporary injunction, waiver of,the hearing by
the agreement of both parties was held to have the effect
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 468, 48 N.E. (2d) 463, 467.
215 Ind. 636, 21 N.E. (2d) 58 (1939).
218 Ind. 263, 32 N.E. (2d) 590 (1941).
219 Ind. 328, 38 N.E. (2d) 341 (1942).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns. 1933) §28-4308.
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of continuing the restraining order as a temporary injunction. 5

Interventwn for Injury to Reputation.
In Dodd v. Reese, 8 the plaintiff sued to set aside a decree and order of adoption on the ground that it had been
obtained through the fraud of an attorney. The attorney
petitioned to intervene on the ground that his reputation
would be irreparably damaged by the charge of fraud made
indirectly against him, and that because he could not estimate the money value of such injury he would have no other
remedy by which to cleanse the taint from his name. Thus,
he asked to be permitted to intervene as a party in the suit
to set aside the adoption and try to prevent the injury.
The court, although allowing the intervention, pointed
out that in divorce proceedings, persons charged with adultery with the defendant are not permitted the right to intervene to protect their names in the absence of statute. The
court also cited the English practice of refusing intervention
in such cases unless the pleadings contained scandals against
them which were altogether impertinent and immaterial to
the trial of the cause. However, the court justifies its allowance of the petition by referring to that part of the State
Constitution which reads: "All courts shall be open; and
every man, for injury done to him in his person, property,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."' 7
The court interpreted this to mean that the interest in reputation should be on the same plane as the interest in property,
so that a remedy must be given. Thus, the right to intervene
as a party8 was granted.
Property Rzghts; Criminal Prosecution and the Operation
of Criminal Statutes.
In Department of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co.,' 9 the plaintiff chain store asked for a declaratory judgment to the effect that its sale of certain vitamin tablets was
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

Merrifield v. Williams, 221 Ind. 619, 51 N.E. (2d) 9 (1943).
216 Ind. 449, 24 N.E. (2d) 995 (1940).
Italics ours. Ind. Const. Art I, §12.
The petitioner had been allowed amicus curiae status m the trial
court, but the Supreme Court felt that this was not sufficient
remedy for his wrong since an anncus curiae appearance gives no
right to exceptions and appeal from adverse rulings.
221 Ind. 44, 46 N.E. (2d) 237 (1943).
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not subject to the state statutes regulating the sale of drugs20

because such tablets were merely "accessory food factors" containing no drugs or poisonous chemicals. The court held that
equity has no jurisdiction to restrain either criminal prosecutions or the operation of criminal statutes unless a major
property right is involved. Not finding any property right
in connection with the plaintiff's case, the court refused to
give a declaratory judgment since it could not operate to
bar a criminal prosecution should one be brought.
State ex rel. Indiana Alcoholic Beverages Comm. v. Circuit Court of Marion County2' held that equity has no jurisdiction which would enable it to enjoin the Alcoholic Beverages Commission from revoking a liquor license, since such
a license does not involve a property right.
The 1945 case of State ex rel. Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit Court22 is much like both those above. The Supreme
Court held that an injunction would not lie to restrain the
enforcement of an allegedly criminal statute cancelling a beer
wholesaler's permit for the same reason, that no property
rights were involved in such a permit, and that equity could
not enjoin the operation of a criminal statute unless substan2 3
tial property rights were present.
Obstruction of Highways.
Burton v. Sparks24 holds that a person cannot maintain
an action for the obstruction of a public highway unless he
can prove that he has sustained some special damage, different in kind and not merely in degree, from that suffered
by the public. The court found that there was evidence of
such injury in the case.
Injunctions against Crimes; Practicing Dentistry and Medicine without a License.
State ex rel. Ind. State Board of Dental Examiners v.
20. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §63-1101 et seq.
21. 221 Ind. 572, 49 N.E. (2d) 538 (1943).
22 ...... Ind. .... , 62 N.E. (2d) 149 (1945).
23. Richman, C. J. and Gilkison, J. agreed m the result of the case
so far as the equity problem was involved, but dissented to the
use put by the majority of the court on the writ of prohibition
where the trial court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the
subject matter, but no jurisdiction over the particular class of
case involved.
24. 109 Ind. App. 531, 36 N.E. (2d) 962 (1941).
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Boston System Dentists25 holds that although the practice of
dentistry without a license is a crime punishable under the
criminal code, an injunction will lie against one illegally engaged in that profession, as the defendant corporation was.
While the court admitted that in the absence of statute, equity
will rarely give an injunction against acts punishable as
crimes, that power may be used in such cases as the instant
one where the public welfare is so deeply involved. The
right is however, expressly given in Indiana by statute.2 8
In State ex rel. Bowers v. Moser,27 it was held that under the statute regulating the practice of medicine and authorizing the issuance of an injunction against violation, 8
it is not necessary for a plaintiff either to allege or prove
threatened continuance of the illegal practice or irreparable
injury to the state. The statute provides for an injunction
upon a showing that the defendant at a certain time engaged in the practice of medicine without a license "without
averring any further or more particular facts concerning the
same".
Interference with Superior Rights.
In Glendenning v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville,2 9 a
mother had conveyed realty to her son, reserving maintenance
and the right to live on the property for as long as she desired, such reservation being granted by the-son as a part of
the consideration for the conveyance. The defendant bank
later acquired title to the property through foreclosure of a
mortgage executed by the son alone, sued the son in ejectment, and obtained a writ of seizure. Then the mother sued
for an injunction against the mortgagee's intefermg with
her right to live on the premises. The court gave the injunction and held the right to live in the house, along with
the right to her maintenance, board, clothing, and medical
attention, to be a lien on the premises superior to the mortgage lien and judgment of the mortgagee.
In a later suit by the mortgagee bank, 30 it was held that
the bank was not entitled to an injunction against interfer25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

215 Ind. 485, 19 N.E. (2d) 949 (1939).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §63-513.
222 Ind. 354, 53 N.E. (2d) 893 (1944).
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §63-1311.
112 Ind. App. 162, 44 N.E. (2d) 251 (1942).
, 61 N.E. (2d) 184 (1945).
Ind. App. -
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ence with its harvesting of crops on the land. The court said
that it should not give a new injunction as long as the old
one was in force, that the old one might be modified if a
sufficient change of circumstances were shown.,'
Labor Relations.
Much of the recent Indiana law as to injunctions in
labor disputes is restated in three appeals arising out of the
same dispute. In the first,32 the evidence in the case was
not before the court. It was an appeal by the plaintiff from
a temporary injunction, and the court had only the special
findings of the trial court. Upon the basis of those findings,
the trial court's action in granting the injunction was, for
the most part, approved. However, the second case, Local
No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union V. Roth,"3 was appealed after
final judgment in the trial court enjoining the picketing in
question, and thus the evidence was brought into the record.
The court held the employer not to be entitled to injunctive
relief because the evidence showed that he had asked his employees to sign a letter of resignation from the union. This
constituted such an interference with the employees that the
employer was barred from injunctive relief under the statute.3 4 The third case merely reiterated the holding of the
second.35
In 1943, in a per curiarn decision 0 the court held that
the picketers could not be enjoined from informing truck
drivers who drove to the rear of the store with deliveries
that the store was being picketed. Such acts were held to
be within the exercise of free speech.
31. For other aspects of the same case, see 112 Ind. App. 157, 44
N.E. (2d) 255 (1942), 112 Ind. App. 160, 44 N.E. (2d) 256
(1942),

-

Ind. -,

63 N.E. (2d) 143 (1945).

32. Roth v. Local No. 1460, Retail Clerks Union, 216 Ind. 363, 24
N.E. (2d) 280 (1939).
33. 218 Ind. 275, 31 N.E. (2d) 986 (1941)..
34. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §40-501 et seq. See m particular
§40-502, ". . . it is necessary that he [the employee] have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor... "
35. Local No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union v. Roth, 219 Ind. 642, 39
N.E. (2d) 775 (1942). It arose by virtue of the trial court's
giving another injunction in the new trial.
36. Local No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union v. Peaker, 222 Ind. 209, 51
N.E. (2d) 628 (1943).
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In Spickelmter v. Chambers, 7 an injunction against picketing was refused even though it was shown that none of
the employees of the place of business involved were union
members, and that no disputes between the employer and
the employees existed at the time of the picketing. However, under the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act 38 forbidding
with few exceptions, the issuance of an injunction in labor
disputes, the court held that no injunction should be given
because there was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of
the act. Such finding was based on the fact that conversations as to wages had been held between the employer and
representatives of the union about six months before picketing began, and that following such conversations, the employer had proposed to his employees several plans for wage
betterment within the organization. The court held these
proposals tended to interfere with the efforts toward organization by the union, such as to preclude the granting
of an injunction.
Long v. Van Osdale39 holds that where non-union employees acquiesced in and accepted the benefits of a contract
negotiated between the union and the employer, which among
other things, set up a committee to approve changes in seniority rights, the non-union men could not have an injunction
against such changes.
Arbitration.
In Janalene Inc. v. Burnett,40 members of a labor union
sued for an injunction against breach of a contract which
contained a clause calling for arbitration as a means of ascertaining whether or not there had been a violation of the
contract. They also asked that the amount of damages resulting from violation be submitted for arbitration under
the contract. The court however, refused to imply that term
in the contract, saying that even in cases where arbitration
as to damages is expressly provided for in a contract, such
provisions are seldom upheld in equity.
37.
38.
39.
40.

113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N.E. (2d) 189f (1943).
Cited supra note 34.
218 Ind. 483, 29 N.E. (2d) 953 (1940).
220 Ind. 253, 41 N.E. (2d) 942 (1942).
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Municipal Corporations;Public Officers.
Haywood Publishing Co. v. West4 ' holds that equity has
jurisdiction to enjoin or invalidate an act of a public officer
in cases where the act results in a useless waste of public
funds unjustifiable in the eyes of reasonable men.
Coleman v. City of Gary42 holds that a court may investigate the acts of a municipal civil service commission to see
if its acts have been capricious or fraudulent, and that such
power exists in the absence of statute. The case was one
involving demotion of a police officer.
Restrictive Covenant; Measure of the Violation.
In Sorrentino v. Cunningham,43 a mandatory injunction
was given against selling liquor in a certain neighborhood.
The defendant's chain of title contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting such sale on the premises, and the court
held it to be one which ran with the land and bound the
defendant even though he had no actual knowledge of its
existence. The court also held that there was no sufficient
change of conditions to justify disregard of the covenant
even though the neighborhood in question, residential when
laid out, had since become a business district.
In another suit for an injunction against breach of restrictive covenant, the court held that if the erection of a
prohibited building is threatened, injunctive relief is available even44 though the violation has not actually been consumated.
41.
42.
43.
44.

110 Ind. App. 568, 39 N.E. (2d) 785 (1942).
220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E. (2d) 101 (1942).
111 Ind. App. 212, 39 N.E. (2d) 473 (1942).
Burke v. Gardner, 221 Ind. 262, 47 N.E. (2d) 148 (1943).

